Misconduct and Bias Policing Investigations – IAB 

What did the September 13, 2011 DOJ Technical Assistance Letter to Suffolk say about these?

III. MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS 

We recommend that SCPD revise its procedures for receiving and investigating reports of police misconduct, including modifying its report form to preserve the integrity of each investigation and to enhance complainant confidentiality. SCPD should modify its current process for investigations of allegations of misconduct by officers to ensure that: (1) all allegations are consistently investigated; (2) complainants remain engaged in the complaint process until resolution; (3) formal or official tracking numbers are established for each allegation, and (4) supervisors receive proper training in how to review and address the findings of internal misconduct investigations. By addressing these issues SCPD will improve its reputation in the Latino community. 

An open, fair, and impartial process for receiving and investigating citizen complaints serves several important purposes. An appropriate citizen complaint procedure ensures officer accountability and supervision, deters misconduct, and helps maintain good community relations, increasing public confidence in and respect for law enforcement. Improving SCPD’s current procedures for handling citizen complaints would maximize these goals. 

Under the SCPD’s current practices, complaints may be made at SCPD Headquarters or any of the precincts located throughout Suffolk County. When a complaint is made, a copy of the printed online Civilian Complaint Report or the manually completed Form PDCS-1300 is given to the complainant. This form includes the complainant’s name, address, and phone number, as well as details of the complaint. If this form is lost by the complainant, or is viewed by the subject of the complaint, it may compromise investigation of a complaint. We recommend that SCPD develop a privacy-oriented tracking system that does not include personal identifiers to protect the identity of the complainant, any witnesses and the officer. This will further serve to preserve the integrity of the investigation. 

D) Early Warning System 

We recommend that SCPD use its current computer database early warning system, IAPRO, to track data on use of force, citizen complaints, internal investigations, service calls, discipline, and other items relevant to each officer’s conduct. SCPD should use this data regularly and proactively to: (1) promote best professional police practices; (2) improve accountability and management; (3) manage the risk of police misconduct and potential liability; (4) evaluate and audit the performance of officers and units; (5) evaluate and assess the effectiveness of training and policy; and (6) recognize and commend positive officer performance. 

In keeping with best practices, we recommend that, to the extent that it does not already, SCPD use IAPRO as follows: 

1. The early warning system should capture information on all investigations and complaints, including non-sustained complaints and complaints prior to final disposition, discipline and other supervisory corrective measures, uses of force, arrests and charges, searches and seizures, service calls, training, awards and commendations, sick leave, civil lawsuits, and other items relevant to an officer’s conduct. 

2. SCPD should use IAPRO to gather and track data for each officer’s arrests by race or ethnicity of the subject. 


3. We also recommend that SCPD require supervisors, including command staff, to review these data for every officer they supervise on a quarterly basis. 


4. We recommend that SCPD compare their subordinates’ IAPRO data to that of the subordinates’ peers, focusing upon complaints against officers and use-of-force reports. 


5. Command staff should review the unit-wide IAPRO data and compare these data with peer units. In addition, a policy should be established providing explicit guidance to supervisory officers reviewing reports to ensure that patterns of possible misconduct are identified, analyzed, and addressed properly by command staff. The aim of this process is to give supervisors valuable information that, if received early, could identify potential problem officers before misconduct occurs. 


6. To use IAPRO effectively as a predictive model tool, SCPD must ensure that the system has defined triggers for management intervention. SCPD should revise as appropriate its IAPRO policy to establish guidelines regarding what specific events will trigger an additional supervisory review, what type of a review will be conducted, and what type of remedial services or action is needed, if any. 


E) Timeline and Protocols for Misconduct Investigations 

SCPD General Order 10-01 states that IAB’s standard for completing investigations is 90 days. We recommend that SCPD adopt a policy that, absent exigent circumstances, all investigations of officer misconduct be completed within 45 calendar days. The investigation should include a review by the Commissioner or his command staff designee. Internal adjudication, if any, of the results of the investigation should be timely completed within deadlines specified under SCPD’s labor agreements. Imposition of any discipline should occur within 30 days of the end of the Commissioner’s review or the end of internal adjudication. Extensions beyond these time periods should require the Commissioner’s written approval (rather than the deputy chief’s approval), based upon criteria set out in SCPD policy, and be communicated in writing to the complainant. Misconduct investigations should be completed within 45 days from receipt of the allegation to disposition, unless extenuating circumstances warrant keeping the investigation open beyond that period. Exigent circumstances include those involving witnesses who are unavailable and criminal cases that are pending. 

F) Complaint Quality Assurance 

We recommend that SCPD’s IAB conduct periodic random follow-up surveys to assess completed misconduct investigations. IAB should contact complainants to ensure that the investigation was handled professionally and thoroughly. Specific questions about the conduct of the investigation should be asked: whether the complainant understood the investigative process; whether the complainant felt that the investigator was thorough in his or her questioning; and whether the complainant received both written acknowledgement of the complaint and notification of the results of the investigation. A dedicated auditing component of SCPD should examine the receipt, investigation, and adjudication of all misconduct investigations. 

Further, when possible, interviews of victims, complainants, witnesses and subjects conducted during misconduct investigations should be tape recorded. There should be randomized periodic audits by supervisors of the taped interviews to ensure that IAB investigators asked probative questions. 

We also recommend that IAB perform an annual check of officers’ New York State driving records for violations or suspended licenses and check local court dockets for civil suits that may have bearing on an officer’s behavior on duty. IAB should act proactively and use both integrity tests and record reviews to identify potential internal affairs issues. 

D) Random Integrity Tests 

We recommend that SCPD consider randomized integrity tests of the complaint reporting system. Testers should call precincts or approach officers in the street indicating they wish to file a complaint of misconduct. IAB can then ensure that the receiving officer provided the complainant with the proper reporting procedure and that the officer reported the information as required by standard operating procedures (SOPs). The SOPs must specifically note that if, during the course of an IAB investigation, a complainant wishes not to proceed further, or wishes to withdraw the complaint, that the complainant understands the investigation will go to conclusion regardless of whether the complainant cooperates. 

SCPD should be proactive in offering assistance to officers who have reported misconduct or other acts of prohibited discrimination to ensure that their careers do not suffer adverse consequences for their cooperative actions. 

D) SCPD Should Revise the Use of Roadblocks in Latino Communities 

We understand that SCPD has used a vigorous program of roadblocks and police sobriety checkpoints. As law enforcement tools, these are established methods of addressing drunk driving and other potential criminal activity. We have received reports, however, that SCPD’s checkpoints have been used primarily to request documentation of citizenship. While we continue to investigate these claims, if true, this is not an acceptable practice. We recommend that SCPD ensure that officers at checkpoints inspect only for sobriety or other specific illegal conduct and do not conduct identity checks or otherwise ask for documentation without a basis for believing that a crime or violation has been committed. 

What did the January 11, 2014 DOJ Settlement Agreement require SCPD to do?(English) (Spanish)

SCPD policy will ensure that all allegations of officer misconduct relating to discriminatory policing, regardless of the manner in which reported, will be forwarded to lAB no later than 48 hours from receipt.
Within 180 days of the Effective Date, SCPD will review the staffing of lAB and ensure that individuals currently serving as or who are selected for lAB possess excellent investigative skills, a reputation for integrity, the ability to write clear reports, and the ability to be fair and objective. 

Supervisors with a sustained complaint of, or who have been disciplined for, excessive use of force, sexual harassment, discrimination, or dishonesty will be presumptively ineligible from assignment to lAB. SCPD policy will require that each lAB investigation of officer misconduct relating to discriminatory policing be reviewed by the Police Commissioner or his designee. 

Per SCPD policy, the Department will maintain a tracking system for all misconduct allegations relating to discriminatory policing that does not rely on personal identifiers. Upon receipt of such an allegation, SCPD will assign a unique numerical identifier to the complaint, which will be provided to the complainant at the time the allegation is made. SCPD will use the centralized numbering and tracking system to track data regarding the number, nature, and status of such misconduct allegations, from initial intake to final disposition, including investigation timeliness and the complainant's notification of the interim status and final disposition of the investigation.
SCPD will maintain protocols to analyze and address trends in complaints relating to discriminatory policing, including demographic data, lodged against SCPD officers.


Six months after the Effective Date, and every six months thereafter during the pendency of this Agreement, 

SCPD will conduct reviews of randomly-chosen, completed misconduct investigations relating to discriminatory policing. 

SCPD must review at least 20 percent of all completed misconduct investigations since the last review. 

The reviews will be conducted by the Police Commissioner or his l her designee, but not an involved individual, and will require contacting the complainant to ensure the investigation was handled in a professional and thorough manner. 

Dissatisfaction with the results of the investigation will be documented and the case may be reopened if the complainant discloses credible new facts which would support allegations not addressed in the original complaint. Throughout the pendency of this Agreement, the results of each review will be forwarded to the United States within five business days of its completion.

Assessment and recommendation of Peter L. Davis, the former special counsel to the Suffolk County Legislature’s Public Safety Committee

In 1987, the Public Safety Committee of the Suffolk County Legislature conducted an investigation of SCPD’s abusive practices.  The committee reported that “fear of retaliation and retribution” within law enforcement had discouraged people from testifying.  Peter L. Davis was special counsel to the Public Safety Committee during the investigation.  

The Public Safety Committee investigation paralleled an investigation by the New York State Temporary Investigation Committee (SIC), which found significant abuses and misconduct by homicide Detectives and the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office.  

According to Davis: 

• “The SIC's 1989 report was an impressive, comprehensive analysis. But no one should read it without an analgesic nearby; its drumbeat of prosecutorial and police sins is unrelenting, with evidence of illegal drug use and related offenses by Suffolk police officers, illegal wiretaps, preferential treatment for relatives of public officials, and a failure by the police department and DA to investigate and punish employees guilty of misconduct (what the commission called "the practice of sweeping law enforcement misconduct under the rug")”

• Regarding homicide cases, the State Investigation Commission uncovered controversies over the recovery of murder weapons, what it called "false testimony" by Det. James McCready (later, the lead detective in the Tankleff investigation), and possible perjury by Suffolk assistant district attorneys. 

• The commission also found a neglect of routine note and record keeping by Suffolk police, as well as "an overreliance on confessions." Suffolk detectives purportedly extracted confessions or other oral admissions in fully 94 percent of Suffolk homicide cases - "an astonishingly high figure compared to other jurisdictions; so high, in fact," in the SIC's view, "that in and of itself it provokes skepticism." 

In January 2008, Peter Davis offered the following thoughts on the Tankleff matter:

• One gets the depressing feeling that, despite the SIC's authoritative report all those years ago, and all the other reports over time, not much has changed in Suffolk law enforcement.

• Nearly 30 years of studies and reports is enough. If (and this is a big if), in the course of its Tankleff investigation, the SIC finds that Suffolk law enforcement has not changed much since its 1989 report, then the SIC ought to change the nature of its recommendations this time around.

• In 1989 it made most of its recommendations to the police commissioner and the district attorney, who head the two major law enforcement agencies in the county. This time the commission should make recommendations aimed at establishing some external controls over those two agencies.

• First, the SIC should recommend that Suffolk County come into the 21st century by establishing a civilian complaint review board to institutionalize genuine civilian oversight of law enforcement. The police department has proved time and time again that it cannot police its own. For too long Suffolk has been known as the Wild, Wild East.  [that was 13 years ago!]

What did the March 12, 2021 Report and Recommendations of the Eastern District Court say?

Defendants have failed to design and implement adequate policies and procedures regarding training, supervision, and discipline, thus allowing and/or encouraging biased policing. 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants have maintained a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional conduct, by failing to design and implement adequate policies, procedures, training, supervision, and discipline policies to prevent discriminatory policing and other misconduct . . . In support, plaintiffs submit a second expert report which found that the SCPD’s policy failures increased the known risk that SCPD officers might engage in discriminatory behavior or other misconduct. See Ex. BB, “Stewart Report.”26 The failure to adopt adequate policies, plaintiffs argue, also permitted Greene’s crimes to continue unabated for years. 

26Robert Stewart is a police practices expert with fifty years of experience in the field of law enforcement, first as a law enforcement officer, and later as a consultant for the DOJ and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies. Stewart has conducted audits of police departments of various sizes across the country. See Stewart Report at 1. 

First, plaintiffs argue that the SCPD failed to adopt an adequate bias-free policing policy within a reasonable time after the DOJ’s Settlement.27 Supp Mem at 11–12. In support of this claim, plaintiffs highlight that, despite the Technical Assistance Letter raising the issue in 2011, the SCPD did not issue an anti-bias policy until 2015. See Stewart Report at 22. Further, early proposals for the training program were found to be insufficient by the DOJ. See Ex. AA, “December 2015 Compliance Report,” 15 (“both the pedagogical approach to teaching the subject and the substantive information provided require additional substantial revisions”). Bias-free policing trainings did not begin until 2018.28While the SCPD has now developed the trainings, and the DOJ has approved of the trainings as they read on paper, the SCPD has stated that the process of actually providing the training to all officers would take at least two years. October 2018 Compliance Report at 8. The Court notes that the Settlement Agreement requires the SCPD to “ensure that all sworn officers receive training on bias-free policing at least annually.” 


See Stewart Report at 27. (“Based on my experience, it should not take two years for a police department of the SCPD’s size to provide bias-free policing training to all officers.”) 


See Love Deposition I at 59. (Q: There was no specific training for bias-free policing prior to 2018? A. Correct...). 


Second, plaintiffs allege that the SCPD has failed to adequately and timely investigate complaints of officer misconduct.29 . . . SCPD’s policy is that IAB 
 investigations must be completed within 60 days and that any complaint not completed within 60 days requires written notice to the Police Commissioner. See Love Deposition I at 288–90. Case summary data reveals that the average number of days from complaint to completion ranged from a high of over three years (1,126 days) in 2012 to six months (182 days) in 2018. See Ex. CC, “IAB Case Summary.” After reviewing IAB investigation files, plaintiffs’ expert reported that the majority of the investigations that lasted more than 60 days did not contain a 60-day written notice in the file. Stewart Report at 43. These delays are particularly concerning because the statute of limitations for the SCPD to take disciplinary action against an officer is 18 months.30 As of September 30, 2019, the IAB had more than 100 cases open for at least seven months including 13 that had been open for longer than 18 months.

29The Court notes the significant risk inherent in delayed investigations of police misconduct. For example, Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 were robbed by Greene in June of 2012 and Plaintiff 2’s sister-in-law, who speaks English, called the SCPD to file a report by telephone on behalf of both men . . . Although Plaintiff 2 received a letter shortly thereafter, acknowledging the complaint, the men were not contacted by the SCPD for an in-person interview until January 2013, nearly six months after the incident . . . During those six months, Plaintiffs 1 and 16 were also robbed by Greene . . . In addition to the risk of repeat offenses that results from delayed investigations, if community members do not have faith that their complaints will be timely investigated, they will not make them. See 
Love Deposition I at 287 (“The DOJ had recognized that we didn’t have, I believe, very many Latino complaints of biased policing and [the DOJ] was concerned...”). Greene was not arrested until 18 months after Plaintiff 2’s complaint was first made to the SCPD. 

Ex. GG, “Caldarelli Deposition,” 119 (“I know that there were a few cases where we did not have the ability to, you know, discipline people because the 18 months lapsed.”). 

For example, Inspector Armando Valencia, the Commanding Officer of the IAB from October 2014 until 2016 testified that he never undertook random audits of IAB officers and that he was unable to provide his understanding of the requirements under the DOJ agreement. 

Third, plaintiffs allege that the SCPD’s process for investigating complaints suffers from significant flaws, that the process for receiving complaints discourages Latinos from filing complaints, and that the SCPD fails to adequately supervise IAB investigators.31 . . . The SCPD’s guidelines for IAB investigators, plaintiffs argue, bias officers against complainants . . . (“The effort you expend may be instrumental in negating a complainant’s allegation”); Id. at D-16328 (“If someone contradicts the complainant... every effort should be made to get that person on paper”). Plaintiffs argue it is no surprise that IAB investigators have never substantiated an allegation of biased policing, something that their expert cited as a “red flag.”32

Fourth, plaintiffs allege that the SCPD failed to implement an early intervention system for supervisors to identify and correct potential discriminatory policing against Latinos. Supp. Mem. at 15–16; Stewart Report at 31–35 (describing the SCPD’s system as “reactive to negative officer incidents rather than proactively identifying potentially problematic conduct.”). An early intervention system was recommended by the DOJ. See Technical Assistance Letter at D-11466 (The SCPD should use an early intervention system to “gather and track data for each officer’s arrests by race or ethnicity of the subject” and “require supervisors... to review these data for every officer they supervise on a quarterly basis.”). The SCPD reported that the system in place does not capture issues pertaining to bias. See Caldarelli Deposition at 311–12. Further, senior officers were unfamiliar with any early warning system. See Ex. JJ, “Burke Deposition” at 136 (“I don’t recall [an early intervention notification system].”). 

It is unclear what portion of plaintiff’s allegations defendants specifically object to. Defendants’ opposition to the motion for class certification merely states, “these allegations [of deliberate indifference] are not supported by the record.” . . . Indeed, rather than countering the allegations set forth by plaintiffs in the voluminous record regarding department-wide policy failures, defendants issue a blanket opposition to the instant motion based on two theories. 

”Although low substantiation rates for biased policing complaints exist in other large police departments, it is my opinion that the SCPD’s zero substantiation rate is a red flag that, in and of itself, calls into question the adequacy of the SCPD’s process for investigating complaints.” Stewart Report at 52.

First, they maintain that defendant Greene was a lone-wolf bad actor.33 In relation to the instant motion, they emphasize that what the named plaintiffs have in common—and argue that what separates them from the putative class members—is that they were all targeted by Greene. In support of this theory, defendants submit a portion of Plaintiff 11’s deposition in which he states that “things are better” since Greene’s arrest. That Greene is no longer an officer at the SCPD able to wield his official badge to harass Latinos is surely a relief for his victims as well as for Suffolk County; however, that one officer who was convicted of a crime has been removed from the force is an impossibly low bar for the County to claim that the SCPD has cured its discriminatory policies or practices.34  Greene’s arrest neither releases the SCPD of any potential wrongdoing in relation to its response or lack thereof to Greene’s criminal conduct, nor does it address the persisting department-wide problems that plaintiffs detail in great length. 

”The named plaintiffs do not identify a single instance other than those incidents relative to Greene in which they were unlawfully deprived of personal property following a vehicular or pedestrian stop or detention by SCPD in Suffolk County; and fail to give any specific information, other than self-serving conclusory allegations, regarding other instances of alleged discriminatory policing they encountered after the arrest of Greene [...] in fact, once Greene was arrested, there is no evidence, other than pure conclusory allegations by the plaintiffs, that any improper police actions continued.” 

While Greene was the only SCPD officer arrested and convicted for robbing Latinos during traffic stops, the Court takes no pleasure in noting that he was a sergeant and a 25-year veteran of the SCPD. Giving the SCPD the most generous benefit of the doubt, it challenges credulity no one in the SCPD had an inkling or a suspicion of Greene’s activities. The egregious nature of his conduct and the fact that his actions persisted with impunity for years is shameful, especially because when complaints were made, had they been promptly and properly investigated, Greene would have been stopped. 

Plaintiff 11’s deposition can be found at Ex. 2. Defendants also point out plaintiff’s testimony suggests that “the checkpoints are now better.” In the 2011 Technical Assistance Letter, The United States informed the SCPD that using checkpoints “primarily to request documentation of citizenship” would be an unacceptable practice. Again, a single statement by one plaintiff that the County’s use of checkpoints has improved fails to rebut plaintiffs’ showing that the SCPD’s failure to timely change its unconstitutional policies, patterns, and practices led to discriminatory policing against Latinos.

The second defense that defendants repeatedly assert to oppose plaintiffs’ motion is that if the United States believes that the County has failed to fulfill its obligations under the 2013 Agreement, there is an enforcement provision, and the United States could initiate court proceedings . . . Defendants urge the Court to conclude that because the United States has never pursued court action against Suffolk County, there is no evidence of discriminatory policing. 

This argument is unpersuasive. The United States may choose or decline to initiate enforcement proceedings for a variety of reasons. The absence of an enforcement action does not establish that the obligations outlined in the agreement have been fulfilled—in fact, the most recent report assessing compliance, notes only “partial compliance” in eleven areas covered by the Agreement. See October 2018 Assessment. Nor does the lack of an enforcement action establish the absence of other biased policies. As plaintiffs point out: “[t]he Agreement, to which Plaintiffs are not a party, is not a litmus test for constitutional policing.” 

How has SCPD complied with DOJ’s guidance and the provisions of the Settlement Agreement?

Independent analysis of IAB reporting revealed the following:

As articulated in DOJ’s latest compliance assessment and evidenced by the data that has been disclosed to the public, the Department has not yet implemented sufficient data monitoring and management (analysis) mechanisms – particularly a computer database early warning system, as stipulated in DOJ’s September 13, 2011 Technical Assistance Letter, to:  

• Track data on use of force, citizen complaints, internal investigations, service calls, discipline, and other items relevant to each officer’s conduct.

• Gather and track data for each officer’s arrests by race or ethnicity of the subject.

• Use this data regularly and proactively to:

  • promote best professional police practices

  • improve accountability and management

  • manage the risk of police misconduct and potential liability

  • evaluate and audit the performance of officers and units

  • evaluate and assess the effectiveness of training and policy; and

  • recognize and commend positive officer performance.

The January 13, 2014 DOJ Settlement Agreement stipulated specific provisions for reporting “all allegations of officer misconduct related to discriminatory policing.” 

Public reporting should include the comprehensive range of criteria related to officer conduct enumerated in the 2011 Technical Assistance Letter.   Publicly-disclosed complaint data should not be limited to the Bias Police cases that are investigated by IAB.  In the aggregate, those complaints represent a mere 8% of the total complaints received by the Police Department and fewer than 17% of the cases retained by IAB between 2016 – 2019.  The failure to disclose adequately anonymized data (data that contains no personally identifiable information) gives the impression that the Department does not want the public to know the full scope, scale and nature of complaint allegations.  To the degree that all complaints are processed pursuant to standardized policy and protocols and the data is managed and maintained on a standardized digital platform, full disclosure should pose no marginal burden.  Disclosure is in the collective interest.  

The Department’s ability to maintain that essential ‘carrot and stick’ balance and promote essential positive cultural change remains compromised as a result.  

• IAB reporting criteria and formatting change with disturbing frequency, without explanation.

• The 2017 IAB report provides the number of prior year(s) cases completed; that data is not provided in subsequent years. That is a material omission. In 2017, IAB reportedly completed a total of 345 cases - 47 (14%) of which were ‘current year’ cases and 298 (86%) of which were prior year(s) cases. The public has an interest in knowing the number of prior year(s) cases open in any year. In the first place, it is an indication of how many cases are not being timely investigated. Beyond that, it helps to understand workflow and caseload. The elimination of that information from subsequent years’ reports, without explanation, distorts understanding of the Bureau’s functioning. It smacks of an intentional effort to obscure relevant data, diminishing confidence in the Department’s objectivity and the veracity of the report overall.

• The IAB reports for 2016, 2017 and 2018 provide separate Complainant Demographics charts for prior years for comparison. Inexplicably, the IAB report for 2019 does not do so.

• The IAB reports for 2016, 2017 and 2018 provide the minimum, maximum and average number of days for case completion. Inexplicably, the IAB report for 2019 does not do so.

• As did prior years’, the 2019 IAB report contained 19 Case Reviews, which ostensibly included the discrete allegations of each complaint. Unlike prior years’ reports, the 2019 IAB report did not include any case synopses or dispositions precluding relevant comparative analysis.

• Department-generated reports indicate that the Department has been challenged to meet its audit commitments, and make no mention of essential integrity tests or disciplinary outcomes. To the public’s perception, essential accountability is far from assured.

• Rather than providing consistent, comprehensive anonymized data sets over time, the IAB report, in particular, presents select data views, in the form of charts, alternately with and without discrete values, that are tailored to support a narrative and conclusion rather than facilitate objective assessment.

• This approach undermines the putative objective of promoting community confidence through transparency. It deprives members of the community of the ability to assess for themselves baselines, patterns, trend lines and anomalies over time. It smacks of a ‘black box’ approach to transparency that, at once, demands and diminishes public trust in the Department’s objectivity and confidence in its narrative and conclusions. It suggests that the public gets to know what the Department wants it to know at any given point in time and has the net effect of raising more questions than it answers.

• The failure to report on the time to close each case and to disclose the results and consequences, if any, of each case significantly undermines public trust and confidence.

• There is a compelling public interest in having access to adequate sufficiently anonymized policing data to be able to independently and objectively assess baselines, patterns, trends and anomalies. Such access informs public perceptions, understanding, trust and confidence. In its absence, members of the community are informed largely by anecdote and prevailing passions that serve to stoke resentment and exacerbate stubborn animosities in a counterproductive doom loop.

• Notwithstanding the specific provisions for reporting “all allegations of officer misconduct related to discriminatory policing” stipulated in the DOJ Settlement Agreement, publicly-disclosed complaint data should not be limited to the Bias Police cases that are investigated by IAB. In the aggregate, those complaints represent a mere 8% of the total complaints received by the Police Department and fewer than 17% of the cases retained by IAB between 2016 – 2019. The failure to disclose adequately anonymized data (data that contains no personally identifiable information) gives the impression that the Department does not want the public to know the full scope, scale and nature of complaint allegations. To the degree that all complaints are processed pursuant to standardized policy and protocols and the data is managed and maintained on a standardized digital platform, full disclosure should pose no marginal burden. Disclosure is in the collective interest.

• The IAB data sets are considerably smaller than the Raw Traffic Data sets, yet the Traffic Data is provided in .csv (comma-separated value) format, facilitating some user-level analysis, while the IAB report provides only summary data in a PDF flat file format. Users are, thus, unable to analyze the underlying data to assess baselines, patterns, trends and anomalies such as complaint type and underlying allegations by precinct, complainant demographic and officer demographic.

The following excerpts from the March 12, 2021 Report and Recommendation of the Federal District Court in the Eastern District of New York merit repeating:

Case summary data reveals that the average number of days from complaint to completion ranged from a high of over three years (1,126 days) in 2012 to six months (182 days) in 2018. See Ex. CC, “IAB Case Summary.” After reviewing IAB investigation files, plaintiffs’ expert reported that the majority of the investigations that lasted more than 60 days did not contain a 60-day written notice in the file. Stewart Report at 43. These delays are particularly concerning because the statute of limitations for the SCPD to take disciplinary action against an officer is 18 months.30 As of September 30, 2019, the IAB had more than 100 cases open for at least seven months including 13 that had been open for longer than 18 months.

The Court notes the significant risk inherent in delayed investigations of police misconduct. For example, Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 were robbed by Greene in June of 2012 and Plaintiff 2’s sister-in-law, who speaks English, called the SCPD to file a report by telephone on behalf of both men . . . Although Plaintiff 2 received a letter shortly thereafter, acknowledging the complaint, the men were not contacted by the SCPD for an in-person interview until January 2013, nearly six months after the incident . . . During those six months, Plaintiffs 1 and 16 were also robbed by Greene . . . In addition to the risk of repeat offenses that results from delayed investigations, if community members do not have faith that their complaints will be timely investigated, they will not make them. See 
Love Deposition I at 287 (“The DOJ had recognized that we didn’t have, I believe, very many Latino complaints of biased policing and [the DOJ] was concerned...”). Greene was not arrested until 18 months after Plaintiff 2’s complaint was first made to the SCPD. 

Ex. GG, “Caldarelli Deposition,” 119 (“I know that there were a few cases where we did not have the ability to, you know, discipline people because the 18 months lapsed.”). 

For example, Inspector Armando Valencia, the Commanding Officer of the IAB from October 2014 until 2016 testified that he never undertook random audits of IAB officers and that he was unable to provide his understanding of the requirements under the DOJ agreement. 

The March 12, 2021 Report and Recommendation of the Federal District Court in the Eastern District of New York, a definitive authority, indicates that plaintiffs in the matter have submitted dispositive evidence that SCPD has failed to comply with its obligations under the DOJ Settlement Agreement.  The court emphasized that SCPD’s failure to timely complete IAB investigations exposes the public to significant potential harms citing the failure to timely investigate Sgt. Greene and the resulting harms he caused.  The court also noted the SCPD’s practice of allowing cases to linger long enough to enable officers to avoid discipline.  Perhaps most troubling is the testimony of the Commanding Officer of IAB that he never conducted random audits, as required by the DOJ Agreement, and that he did not even know the requirements of that Agreement. That is a damning indictment of the culture of the Department and the integrity and philosophy of its leadership. Here, the court grants judicial notice of SCPD’s strategy of running the clock to evade compliance and accountability.  

What does the County’s reform plan provide?

Here again the County’s plan counts on public ignorance and short memories.

POLICY AND OVERSIGHT: The Department has made significant structural and policy changes to the Internal Affairs Bureau with an eye toward greater efficiency and complainant notification and satisfaction. Improvements include: increased investigator staffing, more frequent communication with complainants and faster case-completion times. We have increased our collection of demographic data on police interactions, compiled and completed annual reports on Internal Affairs and Hate Crimes, and established policies to increase language access for those who need police assistance. In 2019, we completed an overhaul of our promotion and transfer process to ensure a more equitable selection process. 

Years after Suffolk County executed the DOJ Settlement Agreement, SCPD officials continue to thumb their noses at the courts and ignore appeals to reason.  They continue to cheat and retreat, run the clock and fail to fulfill the County’s legally binding obligations.  They can well afford to.  They’re playing with an endless supply of taxpayer money, not their own.  Such persistent recalcitrance is injurious of the public interest.  It is compelling affirmation that SCPD is unworthy of the public trust, entirely unable and unwilling to police itself and in dire need of competent, independent, external oversight. While County officials continue to ignore the expert advice of former special counsel for the Public Safety Committee and cavalierly rejected the evidence-based proposal of The People’s Plan as regards the need for civilian oversight of SCPD, the residents of Suffolk cannot afford to do the same.  

We embark on a post-pandemic period of tremendous fiscal uncertainty while just one of the police abuse-related lawsuits the County is defending exposes the taxpayers to potential liability of $30 million or more. 

Suffolk taxpaying voters would do well to familiarize themselves with the March 12, 2021 Report and Recommendation of the Federal District Court of the Eastern District of New York to gain insight into the path the current County and SCPD leadership are on.  Then they should consider who will enjoy the benefits and who will bear the costs if we remain on that path.